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Supreme Court of the United States
Before I begin my formal remarks, let me review
the Circuit's record before the Supreme Court in the
term just completed. Twelve cases from the Second
Circuit came before the Court during the 1988 term;
the Circuit was affirmed in seven cases and was re-
versed in just five. In a thirteenth case, United States
v. Halper^ a district court in the Southern District of
New York was substantially affirmed on direct ap-
peal. On the whole, then, it was a relatively success-
ful term.
Today I would like to share with you a few
thoughts about the choices confronting the civil
rights community in this nation. For many years, no
institution of American government has been as
close a friend to civil rights as the United States Su-
preme Court. Make no mistake: I do not mean for a
moment to denigrate the quite considerable contri-
butions to the enhancement of civil rights by presi-
dents, the Congress, other federal courts, and the
legislatures and judiciaries of many states.
It is now 1989, however, and we must recognize
that the Court's approach to civil rights cases has
changed markedly. The most recent Supreme Court
opinions vividly illustrate this changed judicial atti-
tude. In Richmond v. Croson, 2 the Court took a
broad swipe at affirmative action, making it extra-
ordinarily hard for any state or city to fashion a race-
conscious remedial program that will survive its
constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, the Court went so
far as to express its doubts that the effects of past ra-
cial discrimination are still felt in the city of Rich-
mond, and in society as a whole.
And in a series of cases interpreting federal civil
rights statutes, the Court imposed new and stringent
procedural requirements that make it more and
more difficult for the civil rights plaintiff to gain
vindication. 3
The most striking feature of last term's opinions
was the expansiveness of their holdings; they often
addressed broad issues, wholly unnecessary to the
decisions. To strike down the set-aside plan in Rich-
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mond, for example, there was no need to decide any-
thing other than that the plan was too imprecisely
tailored. Instead, the Court chose to deliver a dis-
course on the narrow limits within which states and
localities may engage in affirmative action, and on
the special infirmities of plans passed by cities with
minority leaders. The Court was even more aggres-
sive in revisiting settled statutory issues under Sec-
tion 1981 and Title VII. In Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 4 the Court took the extraordinary step
of calling for rebriefing on a question that no party
had raised: whether the Court, in the 1976 case of
Runyon v. McCrary, 5 had wrongly held Section 1981
to apply to private acts of racial discrimination. And
in Wards Cove v. Atonio, 6 the Court implicitly over-
ruled Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 7 another estab-
lished precedent which had required employers to
bear the burden of justifying employment practices
with a disparate impact on groups protected by Title
VII. Henceforth, the burden will be on the employ-
ees to prove that these practices are unjustified.
Stare decisis has special force on questions of stat-
utory interpretation and Congress had expressed no
dissatisfaction with either the Runyon or Griggs de-
cisions. Thus it is difficult to characterize last term's
decisions as a product of anything other than a re-
trenching of the civil rights agenda. In the past 35
years, we have truly come full circle.
Regardless of my disappointment with last term's
civil rights decisions, we must do more than dwell on
past battles. The important question now is where
the civil rights struggle should go from here.
One answer, I suppose, is nowhere at all — to stay
put. With the school desegregation and voting rights
cases and with the passage of federal antidiscrimi-
nation statutes, the argument goes, the principal
civil rights battles have already been won, the struc-
tural protections necessary to assure racial equality
over the long run are already in place, and we can
trust the Supreme Court to ensure that they remain
so.
This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.
Affirmative action, no less than the active effort to
alleviate concrete economic hardship, hastens relief
efforts while the victims are still around to be
helped. And to those who claim that present statutes
already afford enough relief to victims of ongoing
discrimination, I say, look to the case of Brenda Pat-
terson. She alleged that she had been victimized by a
pattern of systematic racial harassment at work—
but she was told by the Supreme Court that, even ac-
cepting her allegations as true, federal statutory re-
lief was unavailable.
We must avoid complacency for another reason.
The Court's decisions last term put at risk not only
the civil rights of minorities, but of all citizens. His-
tory teaches that when the Supreme Court has been
willing to shortchange the equality rights of minor-
ity groups, other basic personal civil liberties like the
rights to free speech and to personal security against
unreasonable searches and seizures are also threat-
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ened. We forget at our peril that less than a genera-
tion after the Supreme Court held separate to be
equal in Plessy v. Ferguson, 9, it held in the Schenck9
and Debs 10 decisions that the first amendment al-
lowed the United States to convict under the Espio-
nage Act persons who distributed antiwar pam-
phlets and delivered antiwar speeches. It was less
than a decade after the Supreme Court upheld the
internment of Japanese citizens 11 that, in Dennis v.
United States, 12 it affirmed the conviction of Com-
munist Party agitators under the Smith Act. On the
other side of the ledger, it is no coincidence that dur-
ing the three decades beginning with Brown v. Board
of Education, the Court was taking its most expan-
sive view not only of the equal protection clause, but
also of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of
Rights.
That the fates of equal rights and liberty rights are
inexorably intertwined was never more apparent
than in the opinions handed down last term. The
right to be free from searches which are not justified
by probable cause was dealt yet another heavy blow
in the drug testing cases. 13 The scope of the right to
reproductive liberty was called into considerable
question by the Webster decision. 14 Although the
right to free expression was preserved in several cele-
brated cases, it lost ground, too, most particularly in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 15 which greatly
broadened the government's power to impose "time,
place and manner" restrictions on speech. Looming
on the horizon are attacks on the right to be free
from the state establishment of religion: in a sep-
arate opinion in the creche-and-menorah case, four
members of the Court served notice that they are
ready to replace today's establishment clause inquiry
with a test that those who seek to break down the
wall between church and state will find far easier to
satisfy 16 We dare not forget that these, too, are civil
rights, and that they apparently are in grave danger.
The response to the Court's decisions is not inac-
tion; the Supreme Court remains the institution
charged with protecting constitutionally guaranteed
rights and liberties. Those seeking to vindicate civil
rights or equality rights must continue to press this
Court for the enforcement of constitutional and
statutory mandates. Moreover, the recent decisions
suggest alternate methods to further the goals of
equality in contexts other than judicial forums.
For example, state legislatures can act to
strengthen the hands of those seeking judicial re-
dress. A lesson of the Richmond case is that detailed
legislative fact-finding is critical. Civil rights lawyers
will stand a far better chance in federal constitu-
tional litigation over affirmative action if they are
armed with a state legislature's documented findings
of past discrimination in a particular area. Thus per-
sons interested in the cause of racial equality can en-
sure that legislators have access to empirical studies
and historical facts that will form the bedrock of ac-
ceptable factual findings.
Most importantly, there is Congress. With the
mere passage of corrective legislation, Congress can
in an instant regain the ground which was lost last
term in the realm of statutory civil rights. And by
prevailing upon Congress to do so, we can send a
message to the Court— that the hypertechnical lan-
guage games played by the Court last term in its in-
terpretations of civil rights enactments are simply
not accurate ways to read Congress's broad intent in
the civil rights area.
In the 1990s we must broaden our perspective
and target other governmental bodies as well as
the traditional protector of our liberties.
In closing, let me emphasize that while we need
not and should not give up on the Supreme Court,
and while federal litigation on civil rights issues still
can succeed, in the 1990s we must broaden our per-
spective and target other governmental bodies as
well as the traditional protector of our liberties.
Paraphrasing President Kennedy, those who wish to
assure the continued protection of important civil
rights should "ask not what the Supreme Court
alone can do for civil rights: ask what you can do to
help the cause of civil rights." Today, the answer to
that question lies in bringing pressure to bear on all
branches of federal and state governmental units in-
eluding the Court and to urge them to undertake the
battles for civil liberties that remain to be won. With
that goal as our guide, let us go forward together to
advance civil rights and liberty rights with the fervor
we have shown in the past. Thank you very much.
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